Tortious Water and Land Use in the Big Cypress Swamp by Robinson, Steven D.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
7-1-1971
Tortious Water and Land Use in the Big Cypress
Swamp
Steven D. Robinson
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven D. Robinson, Tortious Water and Land Use in the Big Cypress Swamp, 25 U. Miami L. Rev. 690 (1971)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol25/iss4/4
TORTIOUS WATER AND LAND USE
IN THE BIG CYPRESS SWAMP
STEVEN D. ROBINSON*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 690
II. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND .................................................. 690
III. NATURE OF WATER AND WATERCOURSES .................................... 696
IV. RIPARIAN RIGHTS AND POLLUTION .......................................... 699
V. SURFACE DRAINAGE AND PERCOLATING WATER ................................ 703
VI. FLORIDA DECISIONS ....................................................... 706
V II. INJUNCTION ............................................................. 710
VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 712
I. INTRODUCTION
A search is presently underway by creative attorneys to tie solutions
to environmental problems to an existing common law system. This article
presents such a relationship in the field of Florida water law with par-
ticular reference to the crisis in the Big Cypress Swamp, north and north-
west of the Everglades National Park. Water, climate, and the out-
of-doors are essential to Florida's unique personality. Access to these
elements form a right which must be protected by our courts.
Changes are occurring rapidly in the South Florida ecosystem. Man's
misuse of his water supply has accelerated ecological change to a rate one
hundred times greater than the rate of change in a natural evolving
system.' Scientists predict a damaging ecological change if the Big Cy-
press Swamp is drained for development. To prevent this development,
a number of courses are open including government condemnation and
zoning ordinances. This article will explore a third possible remedy,
injunctive relief.
II. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
The Big Cypress Swamp is located directly north of the western
half of the Everglades National Park. One half of the water flowing into
the park comes from the Big Cypress area. At present this area is sub-
stantially unpolluted. However, as development begins, water pollution
will occur causing serious harm to the Everglades National Park. In fact,
extensive development could destroy the entire South Florida ecosystem.
A report of the Environmental Study Group to the Environmental
Studies Board of the National Academy of Science, National Academy
of Engineering, stated that:
* J.D., University of Miami 1968; Member of the Florida Bar.
1. T. THOMAS, A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF CLIMATOLOGICAL AND HYDROLOGICAL RECORDS
OF SOUTH FLORIDA WITH REFERENCE TO MAN'S INFLUENCE UPON ECOSYSTEM EVOLUTION,
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
THOMAS].
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Substantial commercial and residential activities in this area
would adversely affect the quality and quantity of water flowing
into the northwest section of the Everglades Park and, in addi-
tion, would affect the water available to the coastal popula-
tions of Southwest Florida.2
While the focus of the Environmental Study Group was the inevitable
development around the proposed South Florida jetport, their findings
apply equally to any population intrusion. The group found that three
major harms would result from development: decrease in the quantity
and quality of water for urban uses, an adverse change in the health of
the community, and an adverse effect on the Everglades National Park.
It would be possible to control the first two harms; the third is seem-
ingly impossible to control. The study group suggested condemnation
and the establishment of a water conservation district.4 While this writer
basically agrees with the conclusions of the study group, the purpose of
this article is to discuss an alternative to such action.5
Any legal discussion of this type must be predicated upon an ex-
amination of the scientific facts which explain the causes and the actual
nature of the potential harm. In contrast to land on the east coast of
Florida (primarily within Conservation Area III which is administered
by the Central and South Florida Flood Control District), the water
flow in the western half of the state passes through privately owned lands.
There is a drainage area of 2450 square miles, and water generally flows
in a southward direction. (See figure 2 infra). The United States Geolog-
ical Survey divided the area into three subareas. 6 The first subarea drains
into Conservation Area III. This conservation area holds water used by
the population of the southeast Florida coast, the agriculture industry of
that area, and the Everglades National Park. The water is unpolluted,
and the area is presently undeveloped. Water from the second subarea
flows into the Gulf Coast estuaries through extensive drainage canals.
The third and largest subarea, containing 1450 square miles, is the area
pertinent to this paper. This area drains naturally southward and supplies
water to the Everglades National Park. This drainage is through sloughs
and strands, principally the Okaloacoochee Slough and the Fakahatchee
2. ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES BOARD OF THE NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, ENVIRONMENTAL PROB-
LEmS IN SOUTH FLORIDA 5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP].
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 6.
5. But see R. Eisenbud, The Gum Slough Controversy: Analysis, Diagnosis, Prognosis,
at 64, April 19, 1971 (unpublished thesis at University of Miami School of Law) which states
that a taking by eminent domain would set the unfortunate and expensive precedent of
requiring the government to purchase all lands which ecologically threaten lands the govern-
ment wishes to protect.
6. UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SOME HYDROLOGIC AND BIOLOGIC ASPECTS OF THE
BiG CYPRESS SWAMp DRAINAGE AREA, SOuTHERN FLORIDA 16 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY].
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Figure 1.-Map of the Big Cypress showing the major sloughs and strands.
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SOME HYDROLOGIC AND BIOLOGiC ASPECTS OF TUE BIo
CYPRESS SWAMP DRAINAGE AREA, SOUTHERN FLORIDA 19 (1970.)
Strand which are particular natural concentrates in the flow. (See figure
1 infra).
The ecology of the area is water dominated.7 Plant life exists in
areas inundated by water most of the year. The diverse and abundant
animal life is primarily aquatic. Many of the species such as the American
Alligator, wood ibis, Florida Everglades kite, Southern bald eagle, and
Florida panther are rare and in danger of extinction.
The natural flow is crossed by a number of canals and roads. The
Tamiami Trail, crossing from east to west, has 47 bridges along a 39-mile
reach of canal to insure the distribution of water flow southward." On
7. Id. at 22.
8. Id. at 24.
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Figure 2.-Map of the Big Cypress showing flow directions in December 1969.
UNImo STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SOME HYDROLOGIC AND BIOLOGic ASPECTS OP TU1E BIG
CYPRESS SWAMP DRAINAGE AREA, SOUTHERN FLORIDA 19 (1970.)
the far western side of the swamp land, development in the 188 square
mile tract called Golden Gates Estates has already diverted part of the
flow. These same developers own the Fakahatchee Strand, but have not
yet developed it?
The rainy season in the Big.Cypress lasts from June through mid-
winter, and drainage southward occurs slowly during most of the year.
Runoff is slow, and water is stored for extended periods of up to four
9. Id. at 2S.
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months beyond the rainy season. When water drains through drainage
canals, the recession is rapid, occurring immediately after rainfall and
upsetting the natural flow.10
Fortunately, at present, the Big Cypress is relatively unpolluted,
containing concentrations of nitrogen, phosphorous, organic carbon, and
persistent pesticides in the same relative quantities as found in other
similarly uninhabited areas and much lower concentrations than those
found in the urban areas of the state." Most of the nitrogen is organic,
indicative of a natural environment. The average phosphorous concen-
trations are one-fourth that found in the Upper Saint Johns River which
traverses populated areas. Organic carbon, a measure of the level of
vegetal matter and other wastes, measured less than one-fifteenth of the
concentration found in Dade County canals. 2
The use of persistent pesticides results in a phenomena called bio-
logic magnification, whereby toxins become more concentrated in orga-
nisms higher in the food chain.'" Interference with reproduction and
increased frequency of disease in the fish population are the two major
dangers resulting from pesticide contamination. The pesticides encoun-
tered in Big Cypress are primarily components of the DDT family. Their
concentration, as measured in the sedimentation of the Big Cypress, is
about one-half that in Broward County canals. The aquatic animals
and plants contain a higher concentration of persistent pesticides than
do the sediments. Fish, including sunfish, large mouth bass and Florida
spotted gar, collected in the Golden Gate canal near Naples, contained
concentrates of DDT from 290 to 7430 micrograms per kilogram. This
compares to 5.09 micrograms per kilogram found in the sediment, illus-
trating the higher concentrations near the top of the food chain. 4
The development of the flora and fauna of the Big Cypress depends
particularly on seasonal fluctuations in water levels. However, the eco-
logic system is able to adapt to the natural catastrophies of flood, hur-
ricane and drought. 5 The seasonal fluctuations in water level generally
are about three feet per year, although in some years the variance is as
much as six feet.'6 The land which consists of pine, palm and palmetto
forest, wet prairie, cypress forest, and ponds has a varying water cover.
The result is complete inundation in the wet seasons compared to localized
water concentrations in the sloughs and ponds during the dry season.
This balanced system provides rich sources of food for commercially
important marine animals. The biomass is a food source for fish, snakes,
alligators, and predatory and wading birds. 7
10. EVERGLADES-JETPORT ADVISORY BOARD, Tn BIG C'PREss WATERSHED 6 (1970);
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 6, at 30.
11. GEOLOGICAL SuRvEy, supra note 6, at 46.
12. Id. at 49.
13. Id. at 51.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 55.
16. id. at 60.
17. Id. at 62.
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The Fakahatchee Strand is located to the north and west of the
Everglades National Park. (See figure 1 infra). It is hydrogically con-
nected to the park in times of high water. Water also passes through the
Barron River Canal. To the east above the Gum Slough, the drainage is
directly into the park, averaging 585,500 acre feet per year out of a total
inflow of 1,164,100 acre feet. Only 16 percent of the park area receives
this water, which amounts to 55 percent of the inflow.18 As a result of
man's development activities, the fresh water table in the South Florida
area has already become six feet lower.' 9 Drainage would continue this
trend. In addition, accelerated runoff into canals would occur giving the
ground less time under inundation and thereby affecting the ecosystem.
The discharged water would represent both potential floodwaters and
water potentially salvageable for urban use. ° However, proper controls
(weirs) in canals might be utilized to maintain water tables and, with
the use of new wells, all the water needs for the populated west coast
could be supplied. Pollution would have to be controlled to prevent con-
striction of the use of the shallow aquifier.2 ' The entire area is hydro-
logically linked, and any pollution would pose a threat to the entire area.
Another major effect of drainage would be the movement of salt
water areas further inland-salt water intrusion. Salt water is two and
one-half percent denser than fresh water and exerts two and one-half
percent more pressure at comparable depths. When the two come in
contact at the same level, the seawater pushes the fresh water back. This
movement is checked only if the fresh water is two and one-half percent
higher than the seawater. The Collier County aquifier is approximately
one hundred feet thick. Therefore, the point of demarcation is where the
fresh water level is two and one-half feet higher than the seawater (sea
level).22 A lowering of the water table would affect this balance. Near
Jupiter on the Loxahatchee River, the. only natural river outlet on the
East Coast, upstream development and drainage has already moved the
balance point over a mile upstream.23 At Golden Gates on the West
Coast, drainage of two hundred square miles of wetlands caused extensive
salt intrusion.24 Only an inland water conservation area, as exists on the
lower east coast, will effectively prevent such intrusion.
Environmental effects of increased salinity will produce intolerable
conditions for estuarine species. Silt and mud from construction activities
will affect linthic forms, covering them, reducing light penetrations, and
covering the hard substrata necessary for larval development. Pesticide
18. Id. at 66.
19. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 85.
20. See generally FEDERAL WATER QUALITY ADMINISTRATION, A SY'NoPTIc SuRVEY" or
LmNOLOICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BIG CYPRESS SWAMP, FLORIDA 18 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as FEDERAL WATER QUALITY ADMINISTRATION REPORT].
21. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 6, at 82.
22. ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP, supra note 2, at 41.
23. Personal Interview with Nils Friberg, ecologist, at Jonathan Dickinson State Park,
Florida, April 3, 1971.
24. ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP, supra note 2, at 42.
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levels would be increased. The estuarine environment produces ditritus
from the red mangrove and the decomposition of various microorganisms.
This production only occurs in the correct brackish mixture. Ditritus is
the major food source in brackish waters, and sixteen commercial species
are dependent on it at some stage in their life cycles. 5
As great as the potential harm from controlled and regulated de-
velopment would be, the potential harm from individual development
without controls would be many times worse. Thus, a recent post trial
situation in the Gum Slough area of the Big Cypress becomes eminently
important. In Groover v. A.B.E. Options, Inc.,26 owners of land in the
Gum Slough were prohibited from establishing a drainage district pursu-
ant to the General Drainage Act of 1913, Chapter 298 of the Florida
Statutes. The owners submitted the required petition to the Circuit Court
of Monroe County. The Circuit Court held that the statutory tests for
the creation of a district were not satisfied. The unsatisfied tests required
that the district be to the advantage of the owners of real property
therein, or that the district be in the interest of the public health, con-
venience, or welfare. 7 The landowners are now draining their lands at
their own expense without the use of the special taxing district under
the Act. This draining is under no control, and its haphazard nature is
posing a great danger to the ecosystem. This writer believes that such
drainage and land development is contrary to common and civil law
recognized in Florida. The remainder of this article will explore the de-
velopment of this law and suggest possibilities for its application to the
current problems in the Big Cypress Swamp.
III. NATURE OF WATER AND WATERCOURSES
As long ago as the Institutes of Justinian, running waters, like
the air and the sea, were res communes-things common to all
and property of none. Such was the doctrine spread by civil law
commentators and embodied in the Napoleonic Code and in
Spanish Law. This conception passed into the common law.
From these sources, but largely from civil-law sources, the in-
quisitive and powerful minds of Chancellor Kent and Mr. Jus-
tice Story drew in generating the basic doctrines of American
water law.28
Water itself under civil and common law has a unique status. In
Roman law, it was res communes, things the property of which belonged
to no person. In the Code of Napoleon, water is defined as, "things which
belong to no one, and the use of which is common to all. ' 29
25. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 6, at 63.
26. No. 2-350 (Fla. Monroe Co. Cir. Ct. December 10, 1970).
27. See FLA. STAT. § 298.01 (1969).
28. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 729, 744-45 (1950).




Under the common law, water is the common property of everybody.
The running waters of the earth are not lands, tenements, hereditaments,
or susceptible to actual ownership. A suit may be brought against land
lying at water's bottom, not against the water itself. It can be owned
only when actually reduced to possession. s
The Spanish legal influence in Florida comes from the Partidas
which are a modified form of Roman Law. They declare that the things
belonging in common to all the living creatures of the world are the air,
rain, water, sea and its shores."' Since the statement is not confined to
running water, a problem arose as to when water was actually reduced to
possession. Fortunately, under the common law, the Spanish definition
was held to be a misinterpretation of the Roman Civil Law.8"
Under both civil and common law tests, running water is an entity
apart from the land. A landowner has certain limitation-imposing respon-
sibilities toward his use of the running water, while he has unlimited
rights to minerals and top soil.
Under the common law, whenever a "watercourse" exists, the doc-
trine of riparian rights which controls water usage is applicable. Where
there is no watercourse, various jurisdictions have chosen different rules
relating to rights of usage. Whether there is a watercourse or not, inter-
ference with usage or omission in a landowner's responsibilities is an
actionable tort.83
Before exploring modern interpretations in the area of riparian
rights, one must define "watercourse" and inquire whether the definition
fits the hydrological conditions in the Big Cypress.
Scientific opinion views water movement as a unified hydrological
cycle made up of rainfall, drainage, underground watercourse movement,
random seepage, and movement in an above ground watercourse. How-
ever, the courts, citing precedents that predate modern scientific knowl-
edge on the nature of water flows, continue to make distinctions among
the forms of water movement.84
A watercourse may be defined as a body of water issuing ex jure
naturae from the earth, and by the same law pursuing a certain
direction in a defined channel, till it forms a confluence with tide
water .... 3
5
30. Id. at 467.
31. Id. at 983.
32. Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. 692 (K.B. 1833).
33. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, ch. 40, 41 (1939). [The corresponding sections
in the Second Restatement are not yet completed].
34. F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, THE
FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 141 (1968). The classes of water are not separate and distinct, but in-
terrelated and interdependent. Maloney & Plager, Florida's Ground Water: Legal Problems
in Managing a Precious Resource, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 751, 752 (1967).
35. H. COULSON & U. FORBES, THE LAW OF WATERS AND LAND DRAINAGE 93 (6th ed.
1952) [hereinafter cited as COULSON & FORBES]; accord, Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Roberts,
110 So.2d 82 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
"A watercourse consists of bed, banks, and water." 6 Banks are "the
elevations of land which confine the waters to their natural channel when
they rise to the highest point at which they are confined to a definite
course or channel. '3 7 Together the banks and bed form the channel.38
The channel is the area through which the water flows. Because they are
naturally occurring geological formations, the bank and bed of a channel
are subject to endless change, and thus the law cannot fix the precise
locations for any length of time.
A river may be fed by the rains directly, without any immediate
collection of the water in the bowels of the earth, and still be a
river, and.., a river which naturally runs dry during a great
part of the year does not cease to be a river merely because at
times it is accustomed to become dry. 9
The Big Cypress drains water collected from sources southwest of
Lake Okeechobee. (See figure 2 infra). There are no defined or tradi-
tionally shaped rivers, but drainage is through sloughs. The Okaloacoo-
chee Slough and the Fakahatchee Strand are the principal natural con-
centrates of the flow.
Sloughs are "[t]opographic depressions in the form of wide, shallow
channels ... ."'o They form natural drainage canals. The Fakahatchee
Strand is the largest slough in the Big Cypress, connecting ponds and
conducting water in a slow southerly movement. 41 A slough can have a
channel if it has well defined banks, even though at points the channel is
very wide.42
A determination of whether sloughs are "watercourses" is necessary
for a strict application of the doctrines of riparian rights. In Davis v.
Ivey, 43 the court accepted plaintiff's definition of "watercourse" to include
"cypress swamps and ponds with rising ground forming ridges between
them. These ponds and swamps connected with other ponds and swamps,
forming 'strands' [sloughs], . . ." whereby water moved in a particular
direction.44
In Groover v. A.B.E. Options, Inc.,45 Judge Lopez held that riparian
rights existed in the watercourse extending from the Big Cypress to the
Everglades. This ruling was not appealed, therefore the possibility that a
36. J. ANGELL, WATERCOURSES § 4, at 2 (7th ed. 1877).
37. KINNEY, supra note 29, at 494, quoting Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381
(1851).
38. KiNNFY, supra note 29, at 491.
39. CouLsoN & FORBES, supra note 35, at 93 quoting Stollmyer v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co., [1918] A.C. 485, 491.
40. FEDERAL WATER QUALITY ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 20, at 35.
41. Id.
42. See generally KNEY, supra note 29, at 491 n. 10; Cederburg v. Dutra, 3 Cal. 572,
86 P. 838 (1906).
43. 93 Fla. 387, 112 So. 264 (1927).
44. Id. at 392, 112 So. at 266.
45. No. 2-350 (Fla. Monroe Co. Cir. Ct. December 10, 1970).
[Vol. XXV
TORTIOUS WATER USE
higher court might eventually hold that only a drainage area exists,
requires analysis of the Big Cypress as a surface drainage area. As will
be shown, tightly drawn categories are not dispositive of problems in this
area. Instead, water law is evolving universally towards a hydrologically
related rule of "reasonable use." The reason for seeking tight fitting
categories is to prevent defenses based on condemnation without com-
pensation. A landowner, not permitted to drain his land, would be forced
to use it solely for recreation in order not to interfere with his neighbors'
water rights. However, as in zoning law, the best use is not indicative of
the use which must be allowed. Even under zoning law there would not be a
taking or a cause of action for inverse condemnation if the best use of
the land were prohibited.4 6 To the contrary, those draining their lands
are in fact taking the lower owner's valuable water property right.
IV. RIPARIAN RIGHTS AND POLLUTION
Ownership of the banks of a waterbody causes riparian rights to
attach (the word "ripa" means bank). These rights allow the landowner
to use water flowing through his property. Kent summarizes the law as
follows:
Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a river has naturally
an equal right to use of the water which flows in the stream
adjacent to his lands, as it is wont to run (currere solebat),
without dimunition or alteration. . . . He has no property in
the water, but a simple usufruct while it passes along .... The
owner must so use and apply the water as to work no material
injury or annoyance to his neighbor below him.47
The nature of the right was explained in Taggart v. Town of Jaffrey:
A right to the natural flow of the brook, not unreasonably dimin-
ished or polluted, was inherent in the land, and one of the rights
of use and occupation of which the title was composed ... "
The law follows the principles of equality which require that the
corpus of flowing water become no one's property and that, aside from
a limited use for domestic and agricultural purposes by upper riparian
owners, each riparian owner has the right to have the water flow down
to him in its natural volume and channels, unimpaired in quality. The
riparian system does not permit water to be reduced to possession so as
to become property which may be carried away from the stream for com-
mercial or nonriparian purposes.4
46. See generally 35 FLA. JUR., Zoning § 10 (1961); City of Miami v. Zorovich, 195
So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) ; Neubauer v. Town of Surfside, 181 So.2d 707 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1966); City of Miami v. Walker, 169 So.2d 842 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Waring v. Peterson,
137 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
47. J. KFNT, Commentaries *439-40.
48. 75 N.H. 473, 477, 76 A. 123, 125 (1910).
49. 1 KINNEY, supra note 29, at 759-74; United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339
U.S. 725 (1950).
19711
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In England, pollution is in itself an unlawful act and a nuisance.
Pollution differs from diversion and obstruction of a stream to which
a test of reasonable justification applies.5 0 In addition, there is no differ-
ence between pollution occurring in any part of the hydrological cycle-
water in a defined channel, water without a defined course, or water
percolating through the soil. The law is stated as follows by Justice
Lindley:
But prima facie no man has the right to use his own land in such
a way as to be a nuisance to his neighbor, and whether the nui-
sance is effected by sending filth on his neighbor's land, or by
putting poisonous matter on his own land and allowing it to
escape on his neighbor's land, or whether the nuisance is ef-
fected by poisoning the air which his neighbor breathes, or by
the water which he drinks, appears to me wholly immaterial. If
a man chooses to put filth on his own land he must take care not
to let it escape on to his neighbor's land, Tenant v. Goldwin
(1 Salk. 21, 360).r"
In Hodgkinson v. Ennor,52 Justice Blackburn quotes Tenant v. Goldwin,53
a case involving nuisance caused by a leaking privy, "He whose dirt it
is, must keep it that it may not trespass." Pollution is generally defined
in English common law as
the addition of something to water which changes its natural
qualities so that the riparian proprietor does not get the natural
water of the stream transmitted to him. Thus, the addition of
hard water to soft water, the raising of the temperature of the
water and the addition of something which on meeting some
other substance already in the water, each in themselves harm-
less, caused pollution. ...
The law stated in Tenant v. Goldwin is part of Florida law under
the statute incorporating the common law of England prior to July 4,
1776.11 The English cases cited herein which were decided subsequent
to 1776 derive their precedent from this prior case and are commentary
on it.
In England, the diversion of water from its natural watercourse is
50. COULSON & FORBES, supra note 35, at 193.
51. Ballard v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. D. 115, 126 (1882).
52. 122 Eng. Rep. 446, 447 (K.B. 1863).
53. 91 Eng. Rep. 20, 314 (K.B. 1704).
54. COULSON & FORBES, supra note 35, at 198-99.
55. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1969).
The common law and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local
nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the fourth day of July,
1776, are declared to be in force in this state; provided, the said statutes and com-
mon law be not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and
the acts of the legislature of this state.




unreasonable, per se. In Shury v. Piggot,56 the court held that a water-
course begins ex jure naturae, and having taken a course naturally, it
cannot be diverted. "The course of a spring, is a natural course, and cur-
rent, and to stop this, may be a nuisance to the commonwealth and a
private wrong."15 7
The leading case in Florida is Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline.58
This case involved pollution of water in an underground stream and
established a person's right to receive water from the proprietor above
substantially undiminished in quantity and uncorrupted in quality. In
addition, the court stated that:
The right to the benefit and advantage of the water flowing past
one owner's land is subject to the similar rights of all the pro-
prietors on the banks of the stream to the reasonable enjoyment
of a natural bounty, and it is therefore only for an unauthor-
ized and unreasonable use of a common benefit that one has just
cause to complain. 59
The court held that an underground stream is a waterbody. Although it
affirmed the lower court decision which denied relief (because on the
facts relief was not merited), the court held that there is, in Florida, a
common law right to enjoin pollution and diversion of water.
The tort of pollution (relating to water quality) and the tort of
misusage (water quantity) are similar since both protect rights of a
riparian owner. The Everglades is subject to a number of actionable
harms. One is the loss of water which is necessary for the sustenance of
the native flora and fauna whose very lives are water dependent. In ad-
dition, the life-cycle of the flora and fauna depends on the continued
existence of water as it naturally flows through existing pathways. 60 This
dreed must be compared with the right of up-water landowners to use land
as they choose. Just for example, alligators must be compared to live-
stock, tropical vegetation to concrete structures, and water for the west
coast as balanced against the need for living space for a populated Central
South Florida.
There is little practical difference between diverting a quantity of
water from another to oneself and changing the quality of water before it
flows to another. The rules are substantially the same where property is
riparian to a watercourse. The basic principles applicable to both torts
are comparatively simple, but worth mentioning at this point. The basic
applicable principle is "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus." "Use your
56. 81 Eng. Rep. 280 (K.B. 1688).
57. Id. at 281.
58. 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 780 (1896).
59. Id. at 595, 20 So. at 782; accord, Lamb v. Dade County, 159 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964) (right to undiminished flow in watercourse) ; cf., Koch v. Wick, 87 So.2d 47
(Fla. 1956) (where percolating water is concerned, use is based on reasonableness and bene-
ficial use of land).
60. Ci., notes 1-25 infra and accompanying text.
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own property in such manner as not to injure that of another."61 How-
ever, in the United States, this absolute rule is qualified by the defense
of reasonable conduct. A tortfeasor's reasonableness is compared to the
use of he who suffers the harm. A number of factors are relevant to this
determination. The social value of the defendant's use is compared to
the social value of the plaintiff's. Does the use advance or protect the
public good? Private business has some social value, but the public is
better served by a public use, such as the use of Everglades water by
natural wildlife. Environmental harm under this test would certainly
outweigh private benefit. Utility is determined from the point of view of
a disinterested third party.62 Social values of the conflicting uses must be
weighed.
A comparison of social values was involved in the Florida case of
Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co.68 In that case, the defendant unreasonably
appropriated water from a lake. The court held that the use of land for
pleasure, recreation, and health constitutes a use sufficient to allow a
remedy for an unlawful intereference with its natural condition. The
court further held that there was no distinction between use of the prop-
erty as a farm or as a summer residence. 4
Natural uses are preferred over artificial ones. This is especially true
where the "upstream" use is artificial and the "downstream" use is nat-
ural. In Deetz v. Carter,5 the defendant used his land for agriculture, an
artificial use, while the plaintiff used the water for domestic, household
uses. The court held that the plaintiff had a right to preservation of
adequate water quality as well as quantity.
In a determination of reasonableness, one must look at the suitabil-
ity of the use to the particular watercourse and to the customs and usages
with respect to it. An intentional invasion of another's interest in use
and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if the harm is substantial, and if
the use and enjoyment interfered with is a use well suited to the character
of the locality, while the harmful conduct is not.66 This is, in effect, com-
mon law zoning. The above stated rule is particularly relevant in areas
where uses are not heterogeneous. In the Big Cypress, almost all present
uses are recreational.
Another factor to be considered is the relative ability to avoid harm.
When a riparian proprietor knows to a substantial certainty
that his use of water will interfere with another's use of water,
his use lacks utility unless he has taken all practicable steps
to avoid or minimize the harm.67
61. 3 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 210-4(A) at 46 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as 3 CLARK]; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (4th ed. 1951).
62. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 853, comment a at 362 (1939).
63. 46 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1950).
64. Accord, Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791, 795 (Fla. 1959).
65. 232 Cal. App. 2d 851, 43 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1965); accord, Packwood v. Mendota Coal
& Coke Co., 84 Wash. 47, 146 P. 163 (1915).
66. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 831 (1939).
67. Id., § 853, comment g at 366-67.
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Even if one admits that there is utility in the use of the Big Cypress for
agricultural purposes, an obligation would accrue to avoid all possible
harmful effects.68 Then, although all practicable steps are taken, the com-
peting social values and the suitabilities for use must still be compared.
In other words, this factor is of secondary importance in any determina-
tion.
An important consideration in some states, other than Florida, is
whether a use is riparian. In these states, if the use is non-riparian, its
utility is considered to be of less value than a riparian use.69 Diversion of
water for draining purposes is a non-riparian use, and when weighted
against a riparian's consumptive use, it is definitely prohibited. The logic
of this rule is consistent with the civil law rule that diversions of water
from natural watercourses are prohibited.
The analysis just described was originally developed to resolve com-
peting uses of water, but section 849 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
states that where non-trespassory invasions of a person's interests in the
private uses of water occur (such as pollution of water), the parties are
still governed by the above rules.
V. SURFACE DRAINAGE AND PERCOLATING WATER
Another interpretation of the existing situation in the Big Cypress
situation is that the flow is mere surface drainage, or water percolating
through the ground. Fortunately, in all but one circumstance the legal
tests to be applied are at least as protective of surface drainage water
rights as they are of strictly riparian rights. The weight of authority is
moving toward the more equitable "reasonable use rule," where a bal-
ancing (as discussed above) will lead to optimal beneficial use of waters.
The "reasonable use rule" is replacing the so-called "common enemy
doctrine," a misinterpretation of English common law which is still in
force in a few states.
The "reasonable use test" has its origins at least as far back as
1862 in Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co.70 The New Hampshire
court discussed the lack of logic in a rule which allowed a person to dig
close enough to a neighbor's property to draw off his water by percolation,
but at the same time prohibiting drawing of water directly from a water-
course. Recognizing the interrelationship of the hydrologic cycle, the
court stated,
[t]hese benefits and injuries may often be quite similar in cases
of underground and surface drainage, and of drainage of water-
68. Apparently, a number of property owners in the Gum Slough area of the Big Cy-
press are currently diverting water contrary to the spirit of the order of Judge Lopez in
Groover v. A.B.E. Options, Inc., No. 2-350 (Fla. Monroe Co. Cir. Ct. December 10, 1970).
There should be an analogy between one who fails to minimize harm and one who inten-
tionally maximizes harm.
69. RESTATEUMNT OF TORTS § 855 comment b at 375 (1939).
70. 43 N.H. 569 (1862); See Kalinski & Forste, A Survey of New Hampshire Water
Law, 13 N.H.B.J. 3 (1970).
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courses. In such inquiries the ultimate source of the water is
never regarded; and the immediate source seems to us equally
immaterial; since it in no way changes the nature or effect of
the water, and the regulations now settled by the law of water-
courses were established, not because of any peculiarity in the
origin of water in streams, but because of the good or harm that
may result from its management or use.71
The court refused to consider whether there were any distinctions in
different types of water flow, but (as dictum) stated that it would apply
an overall test which emphasized an "accurate discrimination of the
facts essential to their correct application, with reference to the rights of
others, and the legal necessities of the cases under their varying cir-
cumstances. '7
This doctrine was applied to surface drainage in Swetts v. Cutts.78
The court held as a matter of law that it is more reasonable to divert
percolating or surface drainage than water in a watercourse, but that
there is no absolute right to drain as there is under the "common enemy
doctrine." The only difference between the "reasonable use test" and
the modern view of riparian rights is that the owner from whose property
water naturally drains has the use of all needed water so long as his use
is reasonable. The law of riparian rights weighs the reasonableness of
both competing uses and the possible harm to both users.
Florida adopted the rule of reasonable use in Cason v. Florida
Power Co. 71 In this case, the court held that the question of whether
percolating water, which was the result of the construction of a dam by
the defendant, caused actionable damage to the plaintiff's property was a
mixed question of law and fact to be submitted to a jury. The court held
that uses of property are independent and correlative and depend upon
the reasonability of the use.75
In Great Britain, the right to divert water from its natural flow is
also based upon a test of reasonableness. The diverting of water which
changes its path to the complete exclusion of the lower owner is always
prohibited. In Nuttall v. Bracewell,7 the court stated that if the defen-
dant had injuriously affected the flow of water in a stream to his neigh-
bor below, such action would have been unreasonable.
However, there exists a seemingly conflicting line of English cases
which has become engrained and expanded in American common law.
These cases espouse what has been called the "common enemy doctrine."
The doctrine had its origin in the case of Harcourt v. Spicer where Judge
Brudnel stated:
71. 43 N.H. 569, 576 (1862).
72. Id. at 579.
73. 50 N.H. 439 (1870).
74. 74 Fla. 1, 76 So. 535 (1917).
75. Id. at 6-7, 76 So. at 537.
76. L.R. 2 Ex. 1 (1866).
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If I have an acre adjoining your acre, and my acre is flooded, I
may make a course to avoid the water, and if it floods your acre
yet I shall not be punished for it is legal for me to make this
ditch on my own land. And water is an element which naturally
descends, and so you may make a course and so on until it
comes to a river or a drain.17
The holding has been limited in England to the right to maintain a
permanent natural drainage condition. A lower landowner may not block
the flow in a natural drainage channel, even if it floods his property.
Farnham states,
[T]here is no general right to fight surface water as a common
enemy. All rightful acts with regard to it are confined within
very narrow limits what have not been fully defined. And to
state generally that such water is a common enemy, or that there
is a right to fight it at common law, cannot be otherwise than
misleading. 8
In the United States, an expanded version of the doctrine was
accepted as the prevailing common law in Walker v. New Mexico &
S.P. R.R.,7 9 a Supreme Court decision decided in 1897. The American ver-
sion of the "common enemy doctrine" is illustrated in Jordan v. City of
Benwood which stated:
[E]ach owner may fight surface water as he chooses. He may
use it all, divert it away from the lower land .... [h]e may,
in the use of his land, cause it to flow differently upon his neigh-
bor's land from what it did before.s0
One justification of the doctrine has been that the rule encour-
aged development and improvement in unsettled country.8' In Florida,
flood control programs hinted at this doctrine. As America has developed,
the doctrine has evolved into a less strictly applied rule, or has been dis-
carded entirely. As with the English version, the rule is presently applied
only to the question of whether one may obstruct drainage channels,
and not to the question of the right to divert drainage away from a
lower owner.
Natural drainage cannot be obstructed. An excellent rationale for
this rule was offered in Gormley v. Sanford.
[T]he right of the owner of the superior heritage to the
[natural] drainage is based simply on the principle that nature
has ordained such drainage, and it is but plain and natural jus-
77. 12 Hen. 8, 2 pl. 2 (as cited in 3 H. FARNHAM, LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 889(b) at 2587, note 1 (1904) [hereinafter cited as 3 FAMNAM]).
78. 3 FARNHAM § 889(b) at 2590.
79. 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
80. 42 W. Va. 312, 315, 26 S.E. 266, 267 (1896).
81. Note, Disposition of Diffused Surface Waters in North Carolina, 47 N.C. L. Rev. 205,
207 (1968).
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tice that the individual ownership arising from the local laws
should be held in accordance with pre-existing laws and ar-
rangements of nature. As water must flow, and some rule in
regard to it must be established where land is held under arti-
ficial titles created by human law, there can clearly be no other
rule at once so equitable and so easy of application as that which
enforces natural laws. There is no surprise or hardship in this,
for each successive owner takes with whatever advantages or
inconveniences nature has stamped upon his land.82
In direct contrast to the "common enemy doctrine," the civil law
strictly prohibits any diversion of water from its natural course.
If waters have their course regulated from one ground to an-
other, whether it be the nature of the place, or by some regu-
lation, or by a title, or by an ancient possession, the proprietors
of the said grounds cannot innovate anything as to the ancient
course of the water.8 3
Both the upper and lower landowners have a responsibility not to ob-
struct the natural flow.
In Martin v. Jett, 4 the court interpreted the Code Napoleon,
Article 640, as forbidding the owner of the superior estate to do any-
thing which might aggravate the condition of the inferior one. The
superior estate owner has the right to clear and cultivate his land; how-
ever, the civil law does not permit reclamation of lands naturally covered
by water to the injury of other property.
VI. FLORIDA DECISIONS
The leading Florida case on diversion of waters is Brumley v.
Dorner,s5 where the court adopted the following rule:
The almost universal rule, as gathered from the decisions, is
that no person has the right to gather surface waters that would
naturally flow in one direction by drainage, ditches, dams, or
otherwise, and cast them on the land of the lower owner to his
injury.
The Florida courts have strictly interpreted the civil and common law
rules and have fashioned a rule which reflects the balancing test of
water use in general. However, in the particular case where one party
gathers water that would naturally flow in one direction, and by drain-
age canals or otherwise diverts it from its natural course and casts it on
a lower owner to his injury, the one who diverts the water will be liable
for his action, even if his use is more reasonable than that of the other
82. 52 Ill. 158, 162 (1869).
83. 3 FARNHAM, supra note 77, § 889a at 2586 quoting DOMAT, Civx. LAW (Cushing's
ed.) § 1583 at 616.
84. 12 La. 501 (1838).
85. 78 Fla. 495, 501, 83 So. 912, 914 (1919).
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party. In Brumley the use of an injunction to prevent such injury was
upheld. The opinion recites the civil law right to have surface water car-
ried from the upper proprietor in its natural course and states that sur-
face water is not a natural enemy which an upper proprietor may cast
down upon the lower proprietor at his will.
Florida courts have been consistent in holding that a complete
diversion of water either from a watercourse or from a natural surface
course is unreasonable.8 6 In State Road Department v. Newhall Drainage
District,87 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the lower court action
granting injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, Newhall Drainage District and
a landowner, which enjoined the defendants, the Board of Commis-
sioners of the Everglades Drainage District and the State Road Depart-
ment, from undertaking proposed drainage. The chancellor found that
the proposed drainage would serve no useful purpose and that serious
danger and sanitary problems to the complainants would result. The case
supports the use of injunction by one governmental agency against an-
other governmental agency's interference with the use of land. Here,
potentially damaging flood control was enjoined.
In Seaboard All Florida Ry. Co. v. Underhill,8 a complaint, which
alleged that the railroad built an embankment causing a diversion of
water onto and flooding of the plaintiff's land, was held to state a cause
of action. In Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Hendry, 9 the defendant blocked
the natural drainage of the plaintiff's land and was held liable for the
resulting damage. The defendant airline in Lawrence v. Eastern Air
Lines"0 filled low property which caused water to be diverted from its
natural course onto complainant's property. The court held that persons
changing or restraining the flow of water must guard against the con-
sequences of extra-ordinary rainfall. The airline was merely attempting
to improve its property, but was liable for the injury it caused.
In Florida, the only change in the condition of drainage of surface
waters which is not actionable is a change which increases the flow with-
out diversion from a natural watercourse. This rule was established in
Edason v. Denison.9 Defendant deepened a drainage ditch on his prop-
erty for the protection and improvement of his lands. This caused the
accelerated flow to sometimes inundate plaintiff's servient estate. The
supreme court held that the plaintiff had no actionable right, relying
primarily on San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles County."
86. See, e.g., Stoer v. Ocala Mfg., Ice & Packing Co., 157 Fla. 4, 24 So.2d 599 (1946) ;
Dade County v. South Dade Farms, Inc., 133 Fla. 288, 182 So. 858 (1938); Arundel Corp.
v. Griffin, 89 Fla. 128, 103 So. 422 (1925) ; Pearce v. Pearce, 97 So.2d 329 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1957).
87. 54 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1951).
88. 105 Fla. 409, 141 So. 306 (1932).
89. 112 Fla. 391, 150 So. 598 (1933).
90. 81 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1955).
91. 142 Fla. 101, 194 So. 342 (1940).
92. 182 Cal. 392, 188 P. 554 (1920).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
.-The rule of San Gabriel Valley Country Club and Edason has not been
widely adopted in other jurisdictions and appears to be inconsistent with
the protection usually afforded a landowner whose property had been in-
terfered with. To hold that diversion of surface water from a potential
user is in all cases unreasonable, or that unreasonable appropriation of
surface water is actionable, while holding at the same time that discard-
ing excess water onto another's land in a natural drainage course is a
harm without a legal remedy, is not justifiable in logic, good sense, or
as a matter of public policy.
It should be required at least that the disposal of increased amounts
of surface water on another's land would be permitted only if under the
particular facts, the action is reasonable, as determined under the tests
previously discussed. Otherwise the law will be inconsistent with the
other diversion cases where relief was granted because the diverted water
flows caused excess water damage to the plaintiff's property. In Seaboard
All Florida Ry. Co. v. Underhill,93 a railroad embankment caused plain-
tiff's land to become flooded. In State Road Department v. Newhall
Drainage District,"4 the proposed culvert would also have caused flood-
ing on the complainant's land. In Stoer v. Ocala Manufacturing, Ice &
Packing Co.,9 the complaint alleged that at times the defendant's con-
struction caused overflowing on the plaintiff's land and flooding of his
crops. In that case, the plaintiff was denied relief because the court
charged him with a duty to keep the channel open as part of his responsi-
bility in the cooperative drainage area in which both parties owned
property. However, the court stated that prohibiting the overtaxing of the
watercourse to the injury of a lower proprietor was the object of the rule
in Brumley v. Dorner.6
In Dade County v. South Dade Farms7 the court affirmed an in-
junction prohibiting the county commission from removing a dam plain-
tiffs had erected on a county right of way. The purpose of the dam
was to prevent flooding of plaintiff's 18,000 acres. The court approved
the chancellor's finding which prevented the county from removing the
dam.
Most land is burdened with the hazard or benefits of water ac-
cording to the laws of nature, but in order that less harm be
done and greater justice be accomplished, the better policy
seems to be that no proprietor be called upon to unreasonably
suffer by land of another a burden greater than is natural
whether he be an upland or the lower land proprietor.0 8
Here, by self-help, South Dade Farms prevented the very harm the
93. 105 Fla. 409, 141 So. 306 (1932).
94. 54 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1941).
95. 157 Fla. 4, 24 So.2d 579 (1946).
96. 78 Fla. 495, 83 So. 912 (1919).
97. 133 Fla. 288, 182 So. 858 (1938).
98. Id. at 294, 182 So. at 860.
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plaintiff in Edason v. Denison was forced to endure. Furthermore, the
holding in New Homes of Pensacola, Inc. v. Mayne appears entirely in-
consistent with the holding in Edason. The court in Mayne held,
[t]here appears to be no sharp dispute between the parties to
this appeal as to the basic principles of law which should be
applied to this case. The law of Florida is well settled that the
servitude that the owner of the higher adjoining land has on
the lower land for the discharge of surface water naturally flow-
ing onto the lower land from the dominant estate ordinarily ex-
tends only to surface water arising from natural causes, and
cannot be increased or made more burdensome by the acts or
industry of man.99
Law from other jurisdictions is also instructive in defining the
rights of parties to uninterrupted flow of water courses. In San Gabriel
Valley Country Club, a California court justified its holding by saying
that upon the diversion of water an innocent property owner would
receive the wet burden of a new channel whereas an increased flow
without diversion merely passed the burden on to someone who already
has water drained onto his property. The court, applying a strict doc-
trine derived from old cases, held that any damage is damnum absque
injuria. To the argument that the natural capacity of the channel was
exceeded, thereby flooding plaintiffs lands, the court cited Mizell v.
McGowan,'00 which urged that the term, natural capacity, was difficult
to define and that the limitation would be difficult to enforce in suits
against joint tortfeasors. The act was lawful, thus the injury was not
actionable. Again, a simpler disposition would have been to use a test
of reasonableness of increased flow and to compare the parties' equities.
While the case has not been expressly overruled, 10 California has devel-
oped an important new test regarding discharge of surface water. In
Keys v. Romley, °2 the California Supreme Court modified its civil law
rule and held that a landowner has the responsibility to take reasonable
care in the use of his property to avoid injury to adjacent property
owners through the manipulation of surface waters. Any person threat-
ened has a concurrent duty to take reasonable precautions to protect his
property. If both landowners' uses are reasonable, then the injury must
be borne by the landowner who changes the natural system of drainage.
Justice Mosk stated: "Consistent and wise application of the California
rule encourages profitable and enjoyable use of property, and provides a
basis for mutual resolution of problems caused by errant surface
waters." 0 The question of reasonableness is one of fact, determined upon
99. 169 So.2d 345, 347 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) (emphasis added).
100. 129 N.C. 93, 39 S.E. 729 (1901).
101. Sheffet v. County of Los Angeles, 3 Cal. App. 3d 741, 84 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1970).
102. 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
103. Id. at 409, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
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a consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including
such factors as the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability
of the harm which results, the purpose or motive with which the
possessor acted, and all other relevant matter. 10
4
In applying this test to the situation at hand, this writer feels the equities
favor the Everglades Park. There, harm to the lower landowner is par-
ticularly severe, and correct management of the surface waters must
be borne by the upper landowners.
To summarize, under Florida law a lower landowner has a cause of
action if his land is alongside a watercourse, or if his land is intruded
upon by a new drainage channel. He has no right if he owns property
which is part of an existing drainage system and, if an upper land-
owner uses that system to a greater capacity. The hydrological cycle is
interdependent and interrelated, as the body of water law should be.
Rigid conflicting rules should only apply to conflicting situations. The
water resources of South Florida take many forms, but their best use
will depend on proper managerial direction. This direction, in turn, will
depend on a pragmatic approach to water rights.
VII. INJUNCTION
The use of the injunction is illustrated in North Dade Water Co. v.
Adken Land Co., Inc. 05 In that case, a temporary injunction was upheld
and made permanent against a polluter discharging effluent from a
sewerage disposal plant into a lake situated on the defendant's property
and then through a conduit to a lake situated on plaintiff's property.
In Seaboard All Florida Ry. Co. v. Underhill, the court stated:
The regular and recurrent flooding, though occurring only at a
particular season during the year, constitutes a nuisance as well
as an actionable wrong, and since it interferes with the right of
enjoyment of the lands in the manner in which complainants
have been heretofore using them ... equity has jurisdiction to
protect complainants against what amounts to a burdening or
partial destruction of their estate. °6
In an injunctive action relative hardships are weighed.'0 7 Usually it
is considered a hardship to enjoin operation of an otherwise lawful use.
However, the uniqueness of the Everglades renders a complainant's
damage remedy at law a nullity. Damages would be of no use to the
public which stands to lose its irreplaceable wildlife. As long as the
Everglades shows the scientific probability of substantial harm, an in-
junction should lie to protest that ecosystem.
104. Id. at 410, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
105. 114 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
106. 105 Fla. 409, 412, 141 So. 306, 307 (1932).
107. 3 R. CAtx, supra note 60, § 218.3(B) at 161; City of Miami v. City of Coral
Gables, 233 So.2d 7 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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The appropriativeness of injunction against tort depends upon
a comparative appraisal of all of the factors in the case, includ-
ing the following primary factors;
(a) the character of the interest to be protected .
(b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of
... [other] remedies...,
(c) plaintiff's delay in bringing suit ....
(d) plaintiff's misconduct ...,
(e) the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if in-
junction is granted and to plaintiff if it is denied . ..,
(f) the interest of third persons and of the public ..., and
(g) the practicality of framing and enforcing the order of
judgment .... 108
Interests deserving protection would include environmental factors
and would not be limited to economic interests. Public interest considera-
tions include aesthetic attractiveness, public health, and comfort.' 09
Injunctive relief will lie for a party who has a legal or equitable
right to waters being diverted or polluted."0 Thus an owner of property
along a watercourse or surface flow is a proper plaintiff. The right to
bring a suit has not yet been expanded to non-property owners.
The harms anticipated in the Big Cypress are equally felt by mem-
bers of the public, particularly those sensitive to harmful disruption of
the environment. Environmental protection organizations have the same
interest as landowners in the outcome of any suit involving ecological
factors. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission,"' the plaintiff was an unincorporated non-profit association
consisting primarily of conservationist organizations. The Conference
was held to be a proper party under the Federal Power Act which permits
an appeal by those "aggrieved by an order issued by the commission."'1 2
Cases are providing standing to a larger number of persons to challenge
governmental functioning. 11 Whether this same development will apply to
108. REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 936 at 693-94 (1939).
109. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 938 at 700 (1939).
110. 2 KrNNEY, supra note 29, at 2913; e.g., Platte Valley Irr. Co. v. Buckers Irrigation,
Milling & Improvement Co., 25 Colo. 77, 53 P. 334 (1898).
111. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
112. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(a) (1970).
113. See Association of Data Proc. Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp., 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
(Sellers of data processing challenged the Comptroller of the Currency's ruling permitting
national banks to also sell data processing services. The limitation on standing is whether a
case or controversy exists under U.S. Const. art. III, and whether the statute permits such
intervention. Are plaintiffs within the zone of interests protected by the act); Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (Plaintiff taxpayers
had the requisite personal stake in the suit's outcome, when they alleged that a particular
tax infringed on their constitutional rights to exercise their religious beliefs, modifying
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) ; Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is
it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and
Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601 (1968); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private
Actions, 75 HAIv. L. REv. 255 (1961); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public
1971]
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suits where the government is not the defendant, so as to permit, for
example, public interest groups not owning land in the path of water
flow to sue to enjoin the flow, is the important question if the National
Park Service fails to act to prevent harm to the wildlife the Park pro-
tects. All the necessary requisites for a "case of controversy" exist along
with a proper adversary context and the deep personal interest and com-
mitment of an organization dedicated to environmental protection.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Success in the application of the principles of water law to environ-
mental problems in the Big Cypress will depend upon a recognition that
there is social utility in nature and in the Everglades National Park.
Until now economic consideration, such as profitable use of private prop-
erty, expansion of the economic base, increased production, and meeting
the housing needs of a growing population, have been salient. Now, as the
once vast wilderness is being sacrificed to these considerations, man must
realize that without the natural out-of-doors, providing a necessary
sense of freedom, living on the earth and satisfaction of man's wants
will lose much of their importance. The environment itself is important.
Its social utility is immense. Modern water law permits us to make value
judgments to resolve these competing factors. These judgments must
necessarily stress factors which are environmental.
Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961); Environmental Law-Standing to Sue, 6 LAND &
WATE.R L. REV. 527 (1971).
